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Abstract 
This paper studies the relation between workers’ age and their productivity 
in work teams. We explore a unique data set that combines data on errors 
occurring in the production process of a large car manufacturer with de-
tailed information on the personal characteristics of workers responsible for 
the errors. We do not find evidence that productivity declines with age. 
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1 Introduction 
The age composition in most of the developed world has been shifting towards older 
age groups for more than 100 years now. The steady population aging has intensi-
fied dramatically in consequence of the direct succession of the post war “baby boom” 
and the “baby bust” of the late 1960s. This accelerated aging process will have far-
reaching economic consequences. Most prominent in the public discussion are the 
consequences for the pay-as-you-go financed social security systems. But before the 
babyboomers are going to retire (with their pensions having to be financed by the 
babybusters), extensive changes are to be expected on labor markets and in produc-
tion: In Germany, e.g., the share of workers aged 55 years and older will more than 
double from 12% in 2005 to almost 25% in 2035. In view of this looming evolution, it 
is important to better understand the relation between workers’ age and their labor 
productivity. 
Estimating age-productivity profiles has been on the agenda of labor economists for 
a long time. The main problem with estimating age-productivity profiles is that it 
requires a valid measure for productivity. There are many studies in occupational 
medicine, cognitive psychology, and gerontology that look at how different abilities 
and skills of humans evolve over their life-cycle. They look at muscle strength, sight, 
retentiveness, the functioning of lungs, kidney, and the heart, and many other 
measurable indicators. More or less concordantly, they find that from the age of 25 
onwards, physical and mental fitness are deteriorating.1 But there is certainly more 
to labor productivity than muscle strength, sight, and cognitive ability. Experience 
plays a role and is increasing with age. Hence, there is a need for more direct meas-
ures of productivity. Regarding the measurement of productivity, the existing litera-
ture can be broadly divided into four branches: (i) studies relating plant level pro-
ductivity to the age of the plants’ employees,2 (ii) studies using individual’s wages as 
a productivity measure,3 (iii) studies using interviews of managers on their employ-
                                                 
1 This literature is surveyed in Skirbekk (2004) and Börsch-Supan, Düzgün, and Weiss (2005). 
2 E.g., Hellerstein, and Neumark (1995) and (2004), Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999), 
Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (1999) and (2007), Crépon, Deniau, and Pérez-Duarte (2002), 
Aubert and Crépon (2004), Grund, Westergård-Nielsen (2005), Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2005), 
Malmberg, Lindh, and Halvarsson (2005), and Prskawetz, Mahlberg, Skirbekk, Freund, Dworak, 
Lindh, Malmberg, Jans, Nordström, and Andersson (2005). 
3 E.g., Kotlikoff and Wise (1989), Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992), and Laitner and Stolyarov (2005). 
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ees’ performance,4 and (iv) studies using direct measures of individual productivity 
like, e.g., the number and quality of publications in academic research,5 the value of 
artists’ paintings (in terms of auction proceeds),6 or performance in sports and 
chess.7 
These different approaches all have their vices and virtues. Plant level productivity 
can be measured easily and reliably but the level of aggregation is quite high when 
the goal is to study the relation between productivity and age. Furthermore, the age 
structure of firms is probably not exogenous. 
Wages are the obvious productivity measure in many applications (returns to 
schooling, inter-personal comparisons, etc.) but when it comes to age profiles, the 
problem is that in many occupations, wages increase with age and/or seniority inde-
pendently of productivity. Wage decreases are extremely rare.8 Therefore, Kotlikoff 
and Wise (1989) look at earnings of insurance salesmen whose wages are propor-
tional to the number of insurance contracts they sell. 
Supervisors’ assessments are problematic as they might reflect prejudices about age 
productivity profiles. 
The studies subsumed as approach (iv) are able to measure productivity relatively 
exactly. Therefore, they can estimate age-productivity profiles quite precisely. But 
the occupations where this approach is feasible are rare and particular so that the 
results can hardly be generalized. 
In addition, approaches (ii) through (iv) cannot take into account the fact that work-
ers often work in teams and thereby affect one another’s productivity. More specifi-
cally, if, e.g., older workers devote some of their working time to helping younger 
workers, the individual approach will underestimate older workers’ productivity. 
Related aspects are workers’ contributions to their team’s work climate or how they 
deal with hectic situations (which again affects the productivity of the entire team). 
In this paper, we follow a new approach: We look at productivity at the level of work teams. This 
                                                 
4 E.g., Medoff and Abraham (1980), Hunter and Hunter (1984), McEvoy and Cascio (1989), 
Salthouse and Maurer (1996), and Schneider and Stein (2006). 
5 Jones (2005) and Weinberg and Galenson (2005). 
6 Galenson and Weinberg (2000) and (20001), and Galenson (2005). 
7 Fair (1994), (2005a), and (2005b). 
8 Lazear (1979) and (1981) explains the increasing age-earning profiles with incentive effects. 
Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) and Frank and Hutchens (1993) show in experiments that 
workers have a preference for increasing wage profiles and explain this with loss aversion and 
problems of self-control. 
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takes into account the individual worker’s contribution to her co-workers’ productivity.  
2 The data 
2.1 Our productivity measure and main explanatory 
variables 
We exploit a unique data set that we have compiled from a truck assembly plant of 
the German car manufacturer Daimler AG. At this plant, trucks are assembled by 
work teams on an assembly line. The quantity of output is determined by the speed 
of the assembly line. If work teams differ in productivity, this is not going to show 
up in differences in the quantity of output because the assembly line has the same 
speed for all teams. But production quality differs across work teams as they can 
make errors. Variation in productivity thus becomes manifest only in variation in 
production errors. 
These errors are recorded by a “quality inspector” at the end of the assembly line. 
The quality inspector is able to assign every error to the work place where it hap-
pened. At any time, there is exactly one work team at any work place. In addition, 
every error is given a weight (between 5 and 95) that specifies the severity of the 
error. From this record of errors, we know which team has made how many errors of 
which severity on any day in 2003 through 2006. We observe 3824 workers in 100 
work teams at 50 work places on 973 days. The number of teams is double the num-
ber of work places because on every day, there is an early and a late shift. Our pro-
ductivity measure is the sum of errors per team per day where the errors are rated 
with their respective weights. E.g., if a team with 7 workers makes two errors on a 
day with weights 5 and 30, our (inverse) productivity measure for this team for this 
day takes the value 35. 
The information on errors is matched with personnel data that inform us about the 
daily composition of the work teams, personal characteristics of the workers such as 
age, sex, education, nationality, job tenure, and whether or not a worker is in her 
regular team. 
In addition, we have data on the daily production plan which gives us information 
on the work load. 
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2.2 Matching error data and personnel data 
The error data contain information on the work team where the error occurred. This 
information allows matching the error data with personnel data However, not every 
error in our data set can be related to one single work team. For many errors, the 
quality inspector specified a locus delicti an area of the assembly line that 
encompasses the work places of several work teams. In other cases, the quality 
inspector was able to unambiguously specify the work place but not whether the 
error occurred during the early shift or the late shift. In these ambiguous cases, we 
created an observation for each possible outcome and attributed weights to these 
observations according to their probability. For example, if an error is uniquely 
attributed to a work place but cannot be related to early or late shift, we create one 
observation where we attribute the error to the team that worked at this work place 
in the early shift and an additional observation where we attribute the error to the 
team that worked at this work place in the late shift. Each of these two observations 
enters our regressions with weight 0.5. Figure 1 shows the distribution of these 
observation weights. Roughly one half of the observations have a weight equal to 1. 
The observation weight can have so many different values because the observation 
unit is a team-day. Suppose, e.g., there are two errors that were potentially made in 
team j, one with probability 1/2 and one with probability 1/3. In this case, we create 
three observations, one, where team j makes no error (probability 
( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1 3 1 3− ⋅ − = ), one with 1 error (probability ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 2 1 2⋅ − + ⋅ − = ), and 
one with 2 errors (probability 1 2 1 3 1 6⋅ = ). As work teams in our sample make up to 
eight errors per day, the number of possible values for the observation weight is 
large. Obviously, the observation weights must sum to 1 for each team-day. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of observation weights  
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2.3 Some descriptives 
As the data set we use is quite unique, this section gives a brief description of the 
main variables we use. Table 2 in Appendix A reports descriptive statistics of all 
variables used in the paper. 
Errors  
We observe 8564 errors in 100 teams on 973 days. The distribution of error weights 
(only for those days and teams for which we observe errors) is given in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of error weights conditional on the observation errors 
Age  
The age composition in the plant is fairly representative for the German workforce 
in that workers older than 55 are rare. Figure 3 shows the age distribution in the 
plant (black) in comparison to the age distribution of the German population (grey).  
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Figure 3: Age distribution in the plant (black) and in Germany (grey) 
People younger than twenty are underrepresented because they are still in educa-
tion or training. The share of workers aged 55 and over is low at the assembly line 
because many are already retired or have moved to better jobs. Figure 4 shows the 
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distribution of average age of work teams which constitute the observation unit in 
our regression analysis.  
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Figure 4: Distribution of average age of work teams 
Job tenure  
In addition to age, we have information on workers’ job tenure. Job tenure increases 
with age but the two variables are not perfectly correlated as workers are hired at 
different ages. The distribution of job tenure in the plant is shown in Figure 5. The 
spikes show hiring waves roughly every 5 to 10 years, the most recent having been 
just within the observation period (at job tenure=0).  
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Figure 5: Distribution of job tenure in the plant 
The distribution of average job tenure in work teams in Figure 6 shows that at hir-
ing waves, the newly hired workers have been spread evenly over existing work 
teams as the histogram of average job tenure does not exhibit any comparable 
spikes.  
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Figure 6: Distribution of average job tenure of work teams 
Figure 7 shows the relation between age and job tenure in the plant. For any indi-
vidual worker, age and job tenure are perfectly correlated over time, but as workers 
are hired at different ages, the overall correlation (over time and across workers) is 
“only” 0.79.  
 
Figure 7: Scatter plot of job tenure (vertical axis) vs. age (horizontal axis) 
The relation is tighter at the team level (see Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: Scatter plot of average job tenure (vertical axis) vs. average age (horizontal axis) of 
work teams 
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Team size  
The size of work teams varies between 4 and 35 workers. 90% of work teams have 
between 8 and 21 members (see Figure 9). The average team size is 14. 
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Figure 9: Distribution of team size in the plant 
Sex 
The share of women in the plant is 3.4%. In 71% of all work teams, there are only 
men. In the other 29% of teams, women’s share is 10.9% on average. Within the 
sample period, the female share has increased from 2.8% in 2003 to 3.6% in 2006. 
Nationality 
The composition of the personnel with respect to nationality is given in the following 
table:  
nationality German French Turkish other
share 65.3% 26.0% 4.1% 4.6%
 
Workload 
The production program and thereby the daily volume of work for every team varies 
over time. The required number of workers does not always exactly match the actual 
manning. We have daily information on the actual volume of work (measured in the 
number of required workers) and on actual manning for every day and every team. 
We use the percentage deviation of actual volume of work from actual manning as a 
measure of excess workload per worker. Figure 10 shows that the variation in excess 
workload is substantial.  
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Figure 10: Distribution of excess work load (as a share of actual manning) 
External workers  
Each worker is assigned to one team as her “regular” team. But—due to fluctuations 
in team composition and workload—workers work outside their regular team 6% of 
the time on average. Some workers are explicitly trained for “team hopping” in order 
to stand in wherever needed. Figure 11 displays the distribution over time and 
across work teams of the share of workers external to the work team. 
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Figure 11: Distribution of the share of workers external to the work team 
Fluctuation  
The composition of work teams varies considerably over time. These fluctuations are 
due to vacation, sickness and—most importantly—due to compensatory time off for 
extra hours worked. Workers’ contracts involve 7.5 hours per day while the assem-
bly line runs 8 hours per work shift, so that workers accumulate one half hour over-
time per day. Consequently, they can take every 16 th  day off. This means that in a 
team of 16 workers, on an average day, one worker is absent due to compensatory 
time off. Another source of variation is given by the variation in workload. In order 
to buffer these fluctuations, each work team has about 20% more members than are 
needed on a regular day, because on average about 24% of the workers are absent 
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due to sickness (6%), vacation (12%) or compensatory time off for extra hours 
worked (6%). In addition, there is a pool of especially qualified workers who can fill 
in for absent workers. Furthermore, sometimes workers switch from their regular 
work team to another one if need be. Figure 10 displays a variable of fluctuation 
that we use in our regression analysis. This variable is constructed as the number of 
consecutive days without change in the composition of the work team. As we are in-
terested in the effects of fluctuation on productivity, we only consider changes that 
concern workers who do not regularly belong to the team. We do not consider 
changes within the regular team as we think that these daily changes should not 
affect communication or team work as within the regular work team, workers are 
used to working together in all possible constellations. A value of 4 of our variable 
means thus that in the four preceding days, no external worker joined or left the 
work team. Figure 12 shows that the team composition usually changes from day to 
day.  
 
Figure 12: Distribution of the number of consecutive days without change in the 
team composition 
3 Identification 
In this section, we explain our identification strategy. Studies on the relation be-
tween age and productivity are potentially afflicted with the following problems: 
• How can productivity be measured reliably? How can the productivity of 
different observation units be made comparable? 
• How can we make sure that the variation in age that our estimates are based 
on is exogenous? 
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• How can we deal with potential sample selection bias in the presence of early 
retirement? 
• How can we distinguish age effects from cohort effects? 
This section explains how we deal with these potential problems.  
3.1 Measuring productivity 
Measurement of productivity is difficult. The value added of a worker or a work 
team is usually not observed. And if the value added is observable, it is often not 
comparable across workers or work teams.  
We measure productivity in the assembly process of a truck assembly plant. As the 
quantity of output per worker per day is given by the speed of the assembly line 
(which is the same for all workers), the only thing that distinguishes more produc-
tive workers from less productive workers is the number of production errors they 
make. The number and severity of errors are thus the ideal productivity measure in 
this context.  
Errors are observed at the level of work teams. Thus, our productivity measure 
takes into account the individual workers’ contribution to their co-workers’ produc-
tivity. This is important if older workers contributions are larger. In that case, 
looking at individual level productivity underestimates older workers’ productivity. 
Examples for older workers’ contribution to their team’s productivity are the in-
struction of younger workers,9 being relaxed in tense, hectic situations, contributing 
positively to the work climate, etc.  
Are errors that occur at different places on the assembly line comparable? In some 
sense, they are because every error is given a severity weight. But still, a compari-
son across workplaces is probably unfair as some tasks are more error-prone than 
others. We control for this by using work team fixed effects. In other words, to iden-
tify our coefficients, we only use variation over time within work teams where the 
tasks are homogeneous.  
3.2 Exogeneity of variations in age 
                                                 
9 While an older worker helps a younger worker, the older worker’s productivity is zero as she is not 
producing anything at that time. But the contribution to the work team’s productivity is clearly 
positive. 
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Studies on age and productivity that use plants as units of observation generally 
suffer from the problem that the age composition of plants is endogenous. Studies on 
individuals or work teams within plants potentially suffer from the same problem if 
age affects the assignment of workers to tasks. (If older workers are systematically 
assigned to easier tasks, their productivity may be overestimated.) 
We observe productivity (errors) on the level of work teams. The allocation of work-
ers across work teams (i.e., work places) may be endogenous. But the variation 
across work teams is not used in our estimation as we include work team fixed ef-
fects. The variation in the age composition within work teams over time—which we 
use to identify our estimates—is exogenous. From the responsible managers in the 
plant, we know that the fluctuation within work teams over time (which results 
from sick leave, vacation, and compensatory time off for extra hours worked) does 
not leave any room for optimization. The fluctuation within teams has two compo-
nents: The team composition changes from day to day as some workers call in sick 
and others return from vacation. This day-to-day fluctuation within the core team is 
random and not the result of any optimization. The second component of fluctuation 
is the employment of so-called “team hoppers”. In cases where the workers of the 
core team are too few, the vacancies are filled randomly from a pool of “team hop-
pers”. Thus, we conclude, that the variation in the age composition that we use in 
our estimation is exogenous. 
3.3 Sample selection bias 
One recurrent criticism of studies on age-productivity profiles is that—due to sam-
ple selection bias—they overestimate the productivity of older workers. In fact, 
workers older than 55 years are underrepresented in the workforce. The obvious 
suspicion is that the remaining workers are a positive selection. The less motivated, 
less healthy workers probably retire earlier.  
In our paper, we are able to correct for this potential bias in two ways: A Heckman-
style selection correction model and worker fixed effects. The common problem with 
the correction for sample selection is that—by definition—we usually do not have 
information on those subjects who are not in the sample. As our sample covers sev-
eral years, we do have information on those workers who enter or exit the sample 
within these three years. This enables us to estimate a Heckman-style selection cor-
rection model.  
As our observation unit in the regression is a work team while selection into the 
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sample is an individual phenomenon, we have to aggregate individual Mills ratios to 
team Mills ratios (see Appendix C).  
In addition, selection into (and out of) our sample is more complex than selection out 
of the workforce of an entire plant or economy. Our sample consists only of workers 
on the assembly line. Even the foremen are not included. Workers who leave our 
sample before the age of 65 may retire early (possible because they are less moti-
vated or less healthy than those who remain) or they may be promoted to jobs off the 
assembly line (possible because the performed better than those who remain). We 
therefore constructed different Mills ratios for younger workers (who are more likely 
to leave the sample for jobs off the assembly line) and for older workers (who are 
more likely to leave the sample for early retirement (see Appendix C for details).  
A second possibility to correct for non-random sample selection is to include worker 
fixed effects. This is possible if worker-days are the observation unit and if—over 
time—workers move across work teams.  
3.4 Age vs. cohort effects 
A common problem in estimating age effects (be it on productivity, on consumption, 
savings or other variables) is that in a cross section of individuals, age effects are 
indistinguishable from cohort effects (at least without strong assumptions on the 
functional form). In a panel, where each cohort is observed at different ages, the dis-
tinction becomes possible. However, as individuals are observed over time, the po-
tential existence of time effects may be confounded with age effects. From discus-
sions with the plant managers, we conclude, that time effects do not play any role in 
our sample as there have not been any changes in technology or organization that 
could affect our productivity measure during the four years of our sample period. 
4 Results 
4.1 Regressions on the team level 
This section reports results on the relation between workers’ age and the number 
and severity of errors made in the truck assemble process. As explained in Section 
2.1, our (inverse) productivity measure is the weighted sum of errors per team per 
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day where each error is given a weight according to its severity. Errors are observed 
daily at the team level. Thus, the observation unit in the regressions is a team day. 
We observe 3824 workers in 100 work teams on 973 days. As—along the assembly 
line—work places differ quite substantially and the allocation of workers to these 
work places and to early vs. late shift may be endogenous, we control for work team 
fixed effects. Only the day-to-day variation is used to identify our estimates.10 This 
variation results from fluctuations in the work team composition due to vacation, 
sickness and—most importantly—due to compensatory time off for extra hours 
worked (see Section 2.3). From discussions with managers at the plant on how they 
replace missing workers, we conclude that this variation is truly exogenous. There is 
no optimization taking place at this level. 
In order to allow for non-linear age effects, we use a piecewise linear specification (5-
year splines). We also tried other specifications (polynomials, dummies for 5-year 
age groups. The results are robust with respect to these different specifications.  
As explained in Section 2.2, we have artificially inflated the error data set in order 
to be able to uniquely match the error data with the personnel data. We have 
assigned observation weights to these additional observations such that for each 
team-day, the observation weights sum to 1. We use these weights in the regression. 
The reported numbers of observations refer to the non-inflated data set (and are 
equal to the sum of error weights).  
The left column of Table 1 shows the results of our baseline regression. We also in-
clude a number of interactions with average team age. Therefore, the coefficients on 
the age splines cannot be interpreted as marginal effects. The estimated marginal 
effects including the interaction effects are reported in Table B.1 in Appendix B. The 
upper left chart in Figure 13 displays the (inverse) age productivity profile of work 
teams that results from the estimation. The weighted sum of errors per day in-
creases up to an average age of 30 years and stabilizes thereafter. Column 2 of Table 
1 and the upper right chart in Figure 13 display the results of a regression where we 
correct for possible sample selection bias using a Heckman-style approach (see Ap-
pendix C). Figure 13 shows that the slight decrease of errors with age between aver-
age age 30 and 45 turns into a slight increase. This finding indicates that workers 
who remain in the sample are indeed a positive selection. But the decrease in errors 
after average age 45 remains.  
                                                 
10 We also tried work place fixed effects, thereby using the variation over work shifts in addition the 
variation over time. The results are very similar. 
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Table 1: Regression results: sum of error weights (team level) 
dependent variable: sum of error weights 
 baseline specification  correcting for  sample selection  
correcting for selection 
controlling for job tenure  
age splines 
20 – 25 years -5.75 (0.000)  -6.10 (0.000)  -8.71 (0.000) 
25 – 30 years -5.15 (0.000)  -5.50 (0.000)  -6.08 (0.000) 
30 – 35 years -4.87 (0.000)  -5.22 (0.000)  -5.66 (0.000) 
35 – 40 years -4.88 (0.000)  -5.21 (0.000)  -5.60 (0.000) 
40 – 45 years -4.88 (0.000)  -5.19 (0.000)  -5.64 (0.000) 
45 – 50 years -4.45 (0.000)  -4.77 (0.000)  -5.48 (0.000) 
50 – 55 years -5.61 (0.000)  -5.83 (0.000)  -8.27 (0.000) 
job tenure splines 
00 – 04 years       -1.57 (0.000) 
04 – 08 years       -0.006450 (0.853) 
08 – 12 years       -0.0965 (0.000) 
12 – 16 years       -0.0788 (0.000) 
16 – 20 years       -1.73 (0.000) 
20 – 24 years       -0.209 (0.000) 
24 – 28 years       -0.971 (0.000) 
28 – 32 years       -4.31 (0.042) 
control variables 
schooling years -2.49 (0.000)  -2.78 (0.000)  -2.89 (0.000) 
car specific educ -5.42 (0.000)  -3.39 (0.010)  -2.46 (0.078) 
tech spec. educ -0.517 (0.716)  -2.07 (0.143)  -3.76 (0.010) 
female 23.2 (0.000)  21.8 (0.000)  23.9 (0.000) 
external -0.673 (0.667)  -2.13 (0.182)  -2.33 (0.145) 
team size -0.357 (0.000)  -0.125 (0.052)  -0.094 (0.145) 
(team size)2 -0.00541 (0.000)  -0.00587 (0.000)  -0.00544 (0.000) 
late shift -0.0743 (0.766)  -0.0318 (0.899)  -0.150 (0.952) 
days w/o change -0.0327 (0.001)  -0.0342 (0.000)  -0.0352 (0.000) 
(days w/o change)2 -0.000043 (0.026)  -0.0000485(0.012)  -0.0000494(0.010) 
workload -2.14 (0.002)  -4.38 (0.000)  -2.66 (0.050) 
(workload)2 -0.390 (0.004)  -1.68 (0.001)  -1.74 (0.001) 
tryout Axor -3.75 (0.000)  -3.83 (0.001)  -3.70 (0.000) 
tryout Atego -2.51 (0.000)  -2.44 (0.000)  -2.48 (0.000) 
French -6.09 (0.018)  -6.88 (0.007)  -3.36 (0.202) 
German -10.9 (0.000)  -10.4 (0.000)  -6.01 (0.011) 
Turkish -9.53 (0.008)  -5.85 (0.103)  -0.719 (0.842) 
temperature -0.191 (0.000)  -0.164 (0.000)  -0.160 (0.000) 
temperature2 -0.00545 (0.000)  -0.00559 (0.000)  -0.00547 (0.000) 
humidity -0.137 (0.000)  -0.139 (0.000)  -0.142 (0.000) 
hours of sunshine -0.0517 (0.273)  -0.363 (0.454)  -0.0387 (0.411) 
rainfall -0.517 (0.000)  -0.513 (0.000)  -0.512 (0.000) 
air pressure -0.0515 (0.006)  -0.0502 (0.007)  -0.0526 (0.005) 
Monday -9.21 (0.000)  -8.14 (0.000)  -8.00 (0.000) 
Tuesday -8.29 (0.000)  -7.21 (0.000)  -7.03 (0.000) 
Wednesday 13.88 (0.000)  12.8 (0.000)  12.6 (0.000) 
Thursday -8.99 (0.000)  -7.90 (0.000)  -7.73 (0.000) 
Friday  12.8 (0.000)  11.7 (0.000)  11.5 (0.000) 
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In column 3 of Table 1, we control for average job tenure in the work team. The 
effect of age on productivity (i.e. errors) can now be decomposed in an “experience 
effect” and a “pure age effect”.11 As can be seen in the lower left chart of Figure 13, 
the “pure age effect” is clearly positive. Older work teams make more errors if job 
tenure is held constant.  
Table 1 cont’d: Regression results: sum of error weights (team level) 
dependent variable: sum of error weights 
 baseline specification  correcting for  sample selection  
correcting for selection 
controlling for job tenure  
interactions of age with... 
schooling years -0.0661 (0.000)  -0.0708 (0.000)  -0.0744 (0.000) 
car specific educ -0.145 (0.000)  -0.0986 (0.005)  -0.0851 (0.022) 
tech spec. educ -0.0195 (0.606)  -0.0543 (0.151)  -0.0905 (0.020) 
female -0.614 (0.000)  -0.601 (0.000)  -0.658 (0.000) 
external -0.0197 (0.633)  -0.0274 (0.515)  -0.0334 (0.428) 
team size -0.0197 (0.933)  -0.00533 (0.001)  -0.00569 (0.000) 
late shift -0.000856 (0. 897)  -0.00197 (0.766)  -0.00242 (0.715) 
days w/o change -0.000884 (0. 000)  -0.000919 (0.000)  -0.000950 (0.000) 
workload -0.0250 (0.148)  -0.0472 (0.170)  -0.00240 (0.945) 
tryout Axor -0.0979 (0.000)  -0.0817 (0.000)  -0.0784 (0.000) 
tryout Atego -0.0553 (0.002)  -0.0552 (0.002)  -0.0562 (0.002) 
French -0.111 (0.109)  -0.151 (0.029)  -0.0671 (0.344) 
German -0.249 (0.000)  -0.257 (0.000)  -0.143 (0.026) 
Turkish -0.231 (0.017)  -0.164 (0.089)  -0.0282 (0.771) 
temperature -0.00490 (0.000)  -0.00417 (0.001)  -0.00406 (0.001) 
temperature2 -0.000133 (0.000)  -0.000130 (0.000)  -0.000126 (0.000) 
humidity -0.00342 (0.000)  -0.00349 (0.000)  -0.00356 (0.000) 
hours of sunshine -0.00281 (0.025)  -0.00248 (0.047)  -0.00257 (0.039) 
rainfall -0.0125 (0.000)  -0.0124 (0.000)  -0.0124 (0.000) 
air pressure -0.00167 (0.001)  -0.00166 (0.000)  -0.00173 (0.000) 
Monday -0.210 (0.000)  -0.192 (0.000)  -0.189 (0.000) 
Tuesday -0.186 (0.000)  -0.168 (0.000)  -0.163 (0.000) 
Wednesday -0.317 (0.000)  -0.299 (0.000)  -0.295 (0.000) 
Thursday -0.203 (0.000)  -0.185 (0.000)  -0.180 (0.000) 
Friday -0.287 (0.000)  -0.268 (0.000)  -0.264 (0.000) 
constant -7.96 (0.000)  -7.97 (0.000)  -7.97 (0.000) 
Inverse Mills  
Ratio young    -0.215 (0.000)  -0.217 (0.000) 
Inverse Mills  
Ratio old    -0.313 (0.000)  -0.302 (0.000) 
adj. R2 -0.041   -0.042   -0.044  
# observations: 95,684 (unbalanced panel of 100 work teams on 973 work days). p-values are in brackets. All 
specifications control for work team fixed effects. 
 
In the lower right chart, the weighted sum of errors is plotted against average job 
tenure. Holding average age constant, work teams with longer average job tenure 
                                                 
11 What we call “pure age effect” here is of course again a composition of other effects that come along 
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(i.e. more experience) make fewer errors. For workers who grow old in the plant, the 
productivity enhancing effect of growing experience (job tenure) compensates the 
detrimental “pure” age effect so that the overall age profile is rather flat. 
Table 1 also displays the coefficients on a wealth of control variables. The second 
part of Table 1 (on page 15) contains coefficients on the interactions of these control 
variables with age. The marginal effects of these variables at ages 20, 40, 50, and 60 
are given in Table B.2 in Appendix B. 
As the focus of this paper is on the relation between productivity and age, we only 
comment on some interesting interaction effects of age with these variables.  
 
Figure 15: Age productivity profiles on the team level (in terms of errors) 
Up to an age of 35, the average number of schooling years has a negative effect on 
productivity. Presumably, workers who have spent long time in school are overquali-
fied for and bored of the tasks on the assembly line. This effect dies away (and even 
reverses) as workers grow older. A higher share of workers having a car specific 
education is good for productivity at least for young workers. This effect also wears 
                                                                                                                                                              
with age like deteriorating health, declining cognitive abilities, etc. 
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out (and reverses) as worker age. It should be noted here, that the interaction with 
age might also reflect differences between cohorts rather than age-specific differ-
ences. School education and vocational training have changed over time and the in-
teraction effects might reflect these differences. In Section 4.2, we discuss the prob-
lem of distinguishing between age and cohort effects.  
A higher share of women in the work team is bad for productivity in young teams 
and good in old teams. On explanation for this finding is that women make fewer 
errors but young male workers get distracted (and make more errors) if women are 
in the team.  
The presence of external workers improves productivity; presumably because these 
“team hoppers” are more experienced. This effect wears out in older teams where 
additional experience has less benefit. 
In large work teams, the sum of error weights is larger. Reasons for this effect may 
be lower team cohesion and impeded communication. Older workers seem to have 
more problems with large work teams. 
The weighted sum of errors is larger during the early shift. Working early in the 
morning seems even harder for older workers. 
Fluctuation (inversely measured as “days without change in the team composition) 
seams to affect only older workers productivity adversely. 
Excess workload leads to more errors. This effect is less pronounced in older work 
teams. It seems that experience helps in tense situations. 
4.2 Regressions on the individual level 
In this subsection, we present results from regressions where we use individual 
worker-days as unit of observation. Even though, we observe errors only on the team 
level, regressions on the individual level are worthwhile. More concretely, it has 
three advantages to look at the individual level:  
1. Dealing with the distinction between cohort effects and age effects becomes 
possible. 
2. Dealing with sample selection is easier and more powerful. 
3. We can look at higher ages.  
Identifying age effects on the individual level is possible, because workers move a 
lot between work teams. Figure 14 displays the distribution of the number of 
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work teams that workers work in during our observation period of four years. 
This movement of workers across work teams allows us to identify worker fixed 
effects in addition to work team fixed effects.  
Worker fixed effects remove differences between workers that are constant over 
time. This implies that cohort effects (which are just one form of differences be-
tween workers (of different cohorts) that are constant over time) are removed. 
The remaining variation can be due to age effects and time effects. Time effects 
are unlikely as within the observation period, there have not been any changes in 
technology or organization in the plant. The tasks have not changed and are ab-
solutely comparable across time. Thus, we conclude that the effects we find are 
age effects.  
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Figure 14: Distribution of the number of teams that a workers works in over time 
Worker fixed effects also help remove sample selection bias. If selection into the 
sample is related to differences in productivity between workers that are con-
stant over time, then the bias the results from this non-random selection is re-
moved as we estimate our coefficients on the variation within workers over time 
which is not affected by this bias. 
On the work team level, the 5 percent oldest team observations (4,784 obs.) have 
an average age between 45 and 51 years. The 5 percent oldest individual observa-
tions (83,802 obs.) have an age between 54 and 65 years. On the individual level, 
we have thus the possibility to estimate an age productivity profile that ranges 
from 18 years to 65 years.12 
Table 2 reports results from regressions on the individual level. Due to con-
                                                 
12 From age 60 on, standard errors become quite large. 
 20
straints regarding computing power and memory, we do not include interactions 
with age in this regression and only the most important controls. We cannot con-
trol for job tenure here as on the individual level, age and job tenure are perfectly 
collinear.13 Age effects are again specified as 5-year-age splines. Figure 15 shows 
the estimated (inverse) age productivity profiles where productivity is again 
measured as the sum of error weights per day. After a sharp increase up to the 
age of 25, the sum of error weights declines slightly but monotonously up to the 
age of 60. Thereafter, the mean prediction still declines but the standard errors 
become too large so that the decline is not significant.  
Table 2: Regression Results (individual level) 
 dependent variable: sum of error weights  number of errors  error intensity 
  basic specification  correcting for sample selection   (given an error occurred)
 age splines 
 15 – 20 years -0.858 (0.000)  -0.857 (0.000)  -0.0690 (0.000)  -0.142 (0.397) 
 20 – 25 years -0.143 (0.000)  -0.143 (0.000)  -0.0134 (0.000)  -0.294 (0.000) 
 25 – 30 years -0.0193 (0.032)  -0.0198 (0.039)  -0.00517 (0.000)  -0.340 (0.000) 
 30 – 35 years -0.0317 (0.000)  -0.0310 (0.000)  0.0000618(0.928)  -0.324 (0.000) 
 35 – 40 years -0.0416 (0.000)  -0.0452 (0.000)  -0.000529 (0.436)  -0.385 (0.000) 
 40 – 45 years -0.0216 (0.004)  -0.0189 (0.015)  -0.00592 (0.000)  -0.389 (0.000) 
 45 – 50 years -0.0462 (0.000)  -0.0464 (0.000)  -0.000917 (0.149)  -0.433 (0.000) 
 50 – 55 years -0.0136 (0.087)  -0.0116 (0.048)  -0.00484 (0.000)  -0.422 (0.000) 
 55 – 60 years -0.0314 (0.104)  -0.0557 (0.017)  -0.00168 (0.380)  -0.402 (0.000) 
 60 – 65 years -0.0564 (0.455)  -0.0484 (0.523)  -0.000256 (0.967)  -0.195 (0.423) 
 control variables 
 workload -0.371 (0.000)  -0.371 (0.000)  -0.0320 (0.000)  -0.388 (0.000) 
 workload2 -0.270 (0.000)  -0.270 (0.000)  -0.0208 (0.000)  -1.06 (0.000) 
 team size -0.601 (0.000)  -0.0601 (0.000)  -0.08388 (0.000)  -0.0385 (0.015) 
 (team size) 2 -0.00126 (0.000) -0.00126 (0.000)  -0.0000772 (0.000)  -0.000451 (0.351) 
 external -0.0393 (0.007)  -0.0388 (0.008)  -0.00485 (0.000)  -0.133 (0.000) 
 late shift -0.100 (0.000)  -0.100 (0.000)  -0.00838 (0.000)  -0.107 (0.000) 
 days w/o change -0.000854(0.000)  -0.000851 (0.000)  -0.000951 (0.000)  -0.00315 (0.000) 
 tryout Axor -0.147 (0.000)  -0.147 (0.000)  -0.0142 (0.000)  -0.111 (0.001) 
 tryout Atego -0.0334 (0.000)  -0.0335 (0.009)  -0.00610 (0.000)  -0.174 (0.000) 
 Monday -1.13 (0.000)  -1.13 (0.000)  -0.108 (0.000)  -1.41 (0.000) 
 Tuesday -1.10 (0.000)  -1.10 (0.000)  -0.103 (0.000)  -1.33 (0.000) 
 Wednesday -1.36 (0.000)  -1.36 (0.000)  -0.124 (0.000)  -1.38 (0.000) 
 Thursday -1.03 (0.000)  -1.03 (0.000)  -0.098 (0.000)  -1.40 (0.000) 
 Friday -1.09 (0.000)  -1.09 (0.000)  -0.105 (0.000)  -1.28 (0.000) 
 Inverse Mills  Ratio young    -0.0125 (0.883)  -0.000823 (0.907)  -0.319 (0.123) 
 Inverse Mills  Ratio old    -0.157 (0.060)  -0.00799 (0.246)  -0.389 (0.054) 
 adj. R2 0.439   -0.439   -0.520   -0.036  
 # observations: 1,676,030   1,676,030-   -1,676,030   150,772  
 Unbalanced panel of 3,824 workers in 100 work teams on 973 work days. p-values are in brackets. All specifications control for individual worker fixed effects and work team fixed effects. 
                                                 
13 Even with non-linear specifications the problem of multi-collinearity is too big. 
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The second column in Table 2 and the upper right panel of Figure 15 show the re-
sults for the regression where—in addition to worker fixed effects—we correct for 
non-random sample selection by including inverse Mills ratios from the selection 
equation (see Appendix C 3). The results are virtually unchanged indicating that the 
worker fixed effects essentially remove the selection bias. 
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, we decompose our productivity measure in the fre-
quency of errors (how likely is it that an error occurs) and the severity of errors 
(given that an error occurred). For the frequency of errors, we find a clearly in-
creasing profile: Older workers make significantly more errors. This can also be seen 
in Figure 16. On the other hand, the severity of errors is strongly decreasing with 
age (see Figure 17).  
 
Figure 15: Age productivity profiles on the individual level (in terms of errors) 
Our interpretation of these results is as follows: Errors are rare. They usually hap-
pen in special (tense) situations when maybe something went wrong and there is 
little time to fix it and do the regular tasks. In these situations, older more experi-
enced workers seem to know better, which (severe) errors to avoid by all means. This 
concentration on the vital tasks secures that older workers perform better also in 
terms of our overall productivity measure sum of error weights. 
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Figure 16: Age profiles for the frequency of errors 
 
Figure 17: Age profiles for the severity of errors 
5 Conclusion 
We study the relation between the age structure of work teams and their perform-
ance in an assembly plant of a car manufacturer. We use data on errors made in the 
production process to construct our (inverse) productivity measure. As the produc-
tion quantity is given by the speed of the assembly line, which is equal across all 
work places, work teams that are differently productive only differ in the errors they 
make. From these quality data, we know for all 100 work teams the number and 
severity of errors they made on any day in 2003 through 2006. We combine these 
data with data from the personnel department that gives us the daily composition of 
work teams with personal characteristics of the workers. In addition, we have in-
formation on the daily work load.  
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Controlling for individual worker fixed effects allows us to correct for sample selec-
tion bias. In addition, it prevents us from confounding age and cohort age effects. 
Controlling for work team fixed effects guarantees that the remaining variation we 
use to estimate the age productivity profile is exogenous: The fluctuation in the 
worker composition within work teams over time is random. This fluctuation is due 
to sick leave, vacation and the compensation for overtime and does not leave any 
room for optimization.  
Our findings suggest that productivity is highest among the workers below 30 years 
of age. For workers older than 30 years, the age productivity profile is fairly stable 
(slightly increasing if anything). A decomposition into the effect of job tenure and a 
“pure age effect” reveals that it is indeed job tenure that keeps older workers pro-
ductivity from falling. A decomposition of our productivity measure into the fre-
quency of errors and error severity shows that the older workers’ competence is their 
ability to avoid especially severe errors. While older workers are slightly more likely 
to make errors, they hardly make any severe errors. The results suggest that older 
workers are especially able to grasp difficult situations and then concentrate on the 
vital tasks. 
The huge data set and the truly exogenous variation in team composition enable us 
to estimate age productivity profiles quite precisely. In addition, we are able to cor-
rect potential sample selection bias. On the other hand, our results refer to a single 
plant only. However, we believe that our results are of general interest. Regarding 
our estimates of the age-productivity profile, we find it interesting that even at the 
assembly line—where labor is physically demanding and experience should be com-
paratively unimportant as tasks are rather simple and do not require substantial 
training—productivity does not decline at older ages.  
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Appendix 
A Descriptive statistics 
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regressions
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
Date Jan 29th 2005 Dec 20th 2004 Jan 7th 2003 Dec 20th 2006  
# errors 0.0895 0 0 8 0.598
error intensity 11 10 0 95 5.7
weighted sum of errors 0.984 0 0 135 5.73
individual age 37.1 36.9 17.5 65.2 10.5
average team age 37.1 36.8 23 51.7 4.33
individual job tenure 11.7 10.7 0 39.4 9.92
average team tenure 11.7 11.2 0.0865 31.3 4.55
female dummy 0.0418 0 0 1 0.208
share of women 0.0418 0 0 0.554 0.0662
ind. years of schooling 11.3 11 9 20 2.16
av. years of schooling 11.3 11.3 9 16.6 0.826
dummy for technical training 0.367 0 0 1 0.482
share of workers with technical training 0.367 0.364 0 1 0.16
dummy for car specific training 0.254 0 0 1 0.434
share of workers with car specific training 0.254 0.222 0 1 0.183
team size 14.4 14 4 36 4.44
German dummy 0.653 1 0 1 0.473
share of Germans 0.653 0.662 0 1 0.163
French dummy 0.26 0 0 1 0.434
share of French 0.26 0.25 0 1 0.155
Turkish dummy 0.0410 0 0 1 0.192
share of Turkish 0.0410 0 0 0.418 0.0532
dummy for external workers 0.0718 0 0 1 0.235
share of external workers 0.0718 0.0594 0 1 0.0859
individual inverse Mills ratio young 0.297 0.204 0 3.19 0.354
team inverse Mills ratio young 5.34 4.63 0 20.1 3.33
individual inverse Mills ratio old 0.098 0 0 3.21 0.172
team inverse Mills ratio old 1.76 1.37 0 12.3 1.32
# days without change in team composition 10.2 4 1 200 15.4
dummy for late shift 0.489 0 0 1 0.5
dummy for Axor tryout 0.0634 0 0 1 0.244
dummy for Atego tryout 0.0651 0 0 1 0.247
excess work load 0.0163 0.0291 -0.458 0.826 0.134
max temperature (C°) 17.6 18 -6.8 40.2 9.5
air humidity (%) 75.2 76 31 99 14.3
hours of sunshine 5.75 5.3 0 15.1 4.57
precipitation (mm) 2.15 0 0 76.5 6.12
air pressure (hPa) 1000.4 1000.5 968.5 1022.3 7.35
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B Significance tests for marginal effects  
In this appendix, we report tests on the significance of the gradient of the age vari-
ables as well as some control variables. Table B.1 reports the test results for the 
regressions presented in Table 1. These regressions include a set of interactions 
with age. The regression equation is given by  
50
0 , 5 , 5 ,
20
  a a a a k k age k k
a k k
sum of errorweights AgeSpline x x AverageAgeβ β β β ε+ +
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ +∑ ∑ ∑   (1) 
where subscripts for work teams and days are omitted for the sake of clarity. xk are 
the control variables. and xk AverageAge⋅  are interactions of these control variables 
with average team age. 
The gradient the errors-age-profile (evaluated at sample means) is thus the linear 
combination of the coefficients on the interactions (where coefficients on interaction 
terms are multiplied by the sample means of the respective variables) and the coeffi-
cient on the respective age spline. The gradient of the error-age profile at age 37 is 
for example given by:  
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∑∑  is the sample mean of variable xk. These gradients and 
their significance levels are reported in Table B.1.  
Table B.1: Age gradients 
20 -  25 years 0.915 (0.225) 
25 -  30 years 0.316 (0.000) 
30 -  35 years 0.0380 (0.061) 
35 -  40 years 0.0221 (0.130) 
40 -  45 years 0.00791 (0.699) 
45 -  50 years -0.415 (0.000) 
50 -  55 years 0.640 (0.613) 
Gradients are calculated from coefficients in the
second column of Table 1. p-values are in brackets. 
 
Table B.2 reports the marginal effects of selected control variables at different ages. 
Table B.2: Marginal effects of control variables at different ages 
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 years of schooling 
car specific 
training 
share of 
women 
share of team 
hoppers team size late shift 
days without 
change 
excess 
workload 
20 years 1.36 (0.000) 
-1.42 
(0.023) 
9.79 
(0.000) 
-1.58 
(0.039) 
0.103 
(0.001) 
-0.0712 
(0.549) 
0.0149 
(0.001) 
3.44 
(0.000) 
30 years 0.656 (0.000) 
-0.435 
(0.167) 
3.78 
(0.000) 
-1.31 
(0.001) 
0.156 
(0.000) 
-0.0909 
(0.109) 
0.00570 
(0.021) 
2.97 
(0.000) 
40 years -0.0519 (0.270) 
0.551 
(0.021) 
-2.24 
(0.000) 
-1.04 
(0.000) 
0.209 
(0.000) 
-0.111 
(0.001) 
-0.00349 
(0.048) 
2.50 
(0.000) 
50 years -0.760 (0.000) 
1.53 
(0.003) 
-8.25 
(0.000) 
-0.763 
(0.171) 
0.262 
(0.000) 
-0.130 
(0.136) 
-0.0127 
(0.000) 
2.02 
(0.000) 
60 years -1.47 (0.000) 
2.52 
(0.003) 
-14.3 
(0.000) 
-0.490 
(0.610) 
0.316 
(0.000) 
-0.150 
(0.322) 
-0.0219 
(0.000) 
1.55 
(0.036) 
Gradients are calculated from coefficients in the second column of Table 1. p-values are in brackets. 
C Sample selection 
C.1 The problem 
Older workers are underrepresented in our sample. This might lead to a bias in the 
estimation of the age productivity profile if the selection into the sample is non-ran-
dom with respect to productivity and age. There are two possible mechanisms of 
sample selection that are related to productivity: 
• Early retirement 
• Stepping up the career ladder 
If those workers who are less motivated, less healthy, and less productive are more 
likely to retire early then those workers who remain in the sample are a positive 
selection. Early retirement thus potentially leads to an overestimation of the pro-
ductivity of older workers relative to younger workers. If workers who are more pro-
ductive are more likely to be promoted to jobs off the assembly line then those who 
remain in the sample are a negative selection. Selection due to careers thus poten-
tially leads to an underestimation of the relative productivity of older workers. 
We try to correct this sample selection bias in two ways:  
1. Worker fixed effects 
2. Correction of selection bias à la Heckman (1979) 
C.2 Worker fixed effects 
Workers differ in productivity. If sample selection is related to these differences (and 
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to age), the estimation of the age productivity profile in a cross section is biased. 
Controlling for worker fixed effects in the estimation removes the bias that results 
from differences between workers that are constant over time.  
C.3 Correction of selection bias à la Heckman (1979) 
We have non-random selection and the selection is different for old and young. 
Workers at the assembly line are not a random sample of the working age popula-
tion. There is selection based on age (which is not a problem) but there is probably 
also selection based on something correlated with productivity (motivation, etc.). 
Younger workers may exit the sample if they are good enough to get a job outside 
the assembly line. Older workers may exit the sample if they are not good enough to 
keep working. 
C.3.1 Different selection for young and old 
We observe a person i at date t if she is still working at the assembly line. Suppose 
that younger workers i remain in the sample (sy = 1) if some latent variable  
y
it itz γ ε′ ⋅ +   is positive: 
                                 ( )1 0 ,     0,1   i.i.d.y yit it it its z Nγ ε ε′⎡ ⎤= ⋅ + > ∼⎣ ⎦                                      (3) 
Accordingly, selection for older workers is 
                                 ( )1 0 ,     0,1   i.i.d.o oit it it its z Nγ ε ε′⎡ ⎤= ⋅ + > ∼⎣ ⎦                                       (4) 
For given zit, the workers with high εit are observed. The probability that person i is 
observed is 
                     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 symetryit it it it it it itP z P z P z zγ ε ε γ ε γ γ′ ′ ′ ′⋅ + > = > − ⋅ = < ⋅ = Φ ⋅                      (5) 
If a person is observed, the number of errors yit is given by 
                                                      it it ity x uβ′= ⋅ +                                                             (6) 
For given xit, individuals with high uit make more errors. Now, we need an assump-
tion regarding the relation between uit and the εit. We assume that  
                                             ( ) young
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Now, what about the conditional means of uit with respect to the εit? 
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What's the expectation of yit given xit and zit such that we observe the worker? 
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The expected value of yit  given that worker i is observed is: 
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Equation (11) is estimated where the inverse Mills ratios ( )( )
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dictions from estimating equation (5) using a probit specification. Results from 
estimating equation (11) are reported in the central column of Table 1. Results from 
estimating equation (5) are in Table C.1. 
C.3.2 Errors on the team level 
So far, we considered the case where errors and selection are both observed at the 
individual level. In our data, however, the errors are observed at the team level. 
This makes correction of the selection bias a bit more complicated. If the team j is 
observed, the number of errors yit  is given by 
                                                             jt jt jty x uβ′= ⋅ +                                                  (12) 
where xit are team characteristics like average age or share of women. For given xit, 
teams with high uit make more errors. Selection of workers into the sample is given 
by (equation: selection young) and (equation: selection young). Now, we need an as-
sumption regarding the relation between uit and the  it i1Nj  . We assume that  
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                                    (13) 
and 
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This implies that within the young and within the old, each individual εit of any 
worker i has the same effect on the teams performance. The individual εit are i.i.d. 
The individual effects just add up. 
Now, what about the conditional means of uit with respect to the εit's? 
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What's the expectation of yit given xit and  zit i1N   such that we observe the team? 
     ( ) ( ) ( )| , 1  ,   ,   jt jt it jt jt it it jt jt it it itE y x s i E y x z i E x u x z iε γ β ε γ′ ′ ′= ∀ = > − ⋅ ∀ = ⋅ + > − ⋅ ∀     (16) 
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The expected value of yit given that team j is observed is: 
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Equation (18) is estimated where the inverse Mills ratios ( )( )
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dictions from estimating equation (5) using a probit specification. Results from 
estimating equation (18) are reported in the second column of Table 2. Results from 
estimating equation (5) are in Table C.1. 
C.3.3 Estimating the selection equation 
Table C.1 reports results from estimating the selection equation (5) using a probit 
specification: ( ) ( )0it it itP z zγ ε γ′ ′⋅ + > = Φ ⋅ . The left hand column reports the results 
from the selection equation for the younger workers (<40 years) while the right hand 
column contains the results for the older workers (≥ 40 years). An important vari-
able that affects the probability of being in the sample but not the number and se-
verity of errors is the individual sickness rate. For every worker, we calculate the 
average absence rate due to sickness and include it in the selection equation but not 
in the error regressions.
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Table C.1: Regression results: sample selection 
dependent variable: dummy for being in the sample 
 workers younger than 40 years workers older than 40 years 
age dummies 
18 < age < 20 0.143 (0.239)   
20 < age < 22 0.130 (0.285)   
22 < age < 24 0.267 (0.028)   
24 < age < 26 0.321 (0.008)   
26 < age < 28 0.503 (0.000)   
28 < age < 30 0.686 (0.000)   
30 < age < 32 0.823 (0.000)   
32 < age < 34 0.924 (0.000)   
34 < age < 36 1.13 (0.000)   
36 < age < 38 1.16 (0.000)   
38 < age < 40 1.10 (0.000)   
40 < age < 42   6.58 (0.000) 
42 < age < 44   6.54 (0.000) 
44 < age < 46   6.65 (0.000) 
46 < age < 48   6.56 (0.000) 
48 < age < 50   6.50 (0.000) 
50 < age < 52   6.59 (0.000) 
52 < age < 54   6.63 (0.000) 
54 < age < 56   6.19 (0.000) 
56 < age < 58   5.65 (0.000) 
58 < age < 60   4.54 (0.000) 
60 < age < 62   4.84 (0.000) 
62 < age < 64   6.04 (0.000) 
64 < age   4.87 (0.000) 
average team age 0.0308 (0.000) -0.0516 (0.000) 
sickness rate 0.00641 (0.000) -0.00683 (0.000) 
years of schooling  0.0971 (0.000) -0.0294 (0.000) 
av. team schooling years 0.0605 (0.000) -0.289 (0.000) 
German dummy 1.03 (0.000) 0.196 (0.000) 
share of Germans -3.93 (0.000) -2.38 (0.000) 
French dummy 1.06 (0.000) 0.418 (0.000) 
share of French -5.26 (0.000) -3.96 (0.000) 
Turkish dummy 1.45 (0.000) 0.259 (0.000) 
share of Turkish -3.61 (0.000) -5.13 (0.000) 
female dummy -0.556 (0.000) -0.339 (0.000) 
share of women -0.821 (0.000) -0.121 (0.012) 
late shift 0.379 (0.000) -0.395 (0.000) 
team hopper dummy -0.740 (0.000) -1.75 (0.000) 
share of team hoppers -3.30 (0.000) -1.56 (0.000) 
team size -0.00659 (0.000) 0.0255 (0.000) 
av. team tenure 0.00438 (0.000) 0.0547 (0.000) 
PFI 0.0741 (0.000) -0.640 (0.000) 
R2 0.247  0.285  
# observations 2030939  1164115  
p-values in brackets 
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